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INSIDER TRADING AND ENTREPRENEURIAL
ACTION*
D. GORDON SMITH**
The core function of entrepreneurs is to challenge incumbents.
Henry Manne famously argued that prohibitions on insider trading
serve to entrench large, publicly traded corporations. According to
Manne, when insider trading is prohibited, large corporations
increase compensation levels to compete for executive talent. But
even modern compensation levels do not adequately reward
entrepreneurial talent because innovations are difficult to value and
finding the right person to reward for successful innovation is often
impossible to do with confidence. Thus, Manne proposed that
executive entrepreneurs within public corporations should be
compensated through profits gained from insider trading. This
Essay examines Manne’s argument more closely in light of recent
developments in entrepreneurship theory and insider trading law
and concludes that prohibitions on insider trading can facilitate
entrepreneurial action.

* © 2017 D. Gordon Smith.
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In 1966, Henry Manne offered a provocative proposal to legalize
insider trading as a means of promoting entrepreneurial action.1 Manne
imagined a “market for entrepreneurial services” in which large,
publicly held corporations hired entrepreneurs to produce valuable
innovations.2 Rather than enticing entrepreneurs with traditional
compensation in the form of salaries, bonuses, or stock options—which
Manne argued were impossible to calibrate to particular levels of
entrepreneurial service3—corporations would offer the opportunity to
gain from insider trading, and entrepreneurs would be “attracted to
those positions offering the greatest opportunity for them to make large,
indefinite gains.”4 While many commentators have engaged Manne’s
proposal, most have ignored Manne’s attempt to link insider trading to
entrepreneurial action,5 focusing instead on the more general issue of
whether insider trading aligns a manager’s incentives with shareholder
wealth.6 This Essay takes the role of the corporate entrepreneur
seriously and argues that the legalization of insider trading would
actually have a dampening effect on corporate entrepreneurship.
Moreover, this Essay posits that the incentive problems identified by
Manne have already been solved by innovations in startup financing.
Critics of Manne’s proposal are legion. Some have argued that
corporate entrepreneurs can, in fact, be compensated at appropriate

1. See generally HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET
(1966).
2. Id. at 155.
3. Id. at 132–38.
4. Id. at 155.
5. For a searching challenge to Manne’s conception of the entrepreneur, see James
Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading,
80 CALIF. L. REV. 1413, 1508 (1992) (“Manne pins his hopes on a Faustian vision of
entrepreneurship, a vision which puts innovation (and not mere labor) at the heart of the
issue and which seeks to reconcile society to the granting of a monopoly rent by promising the
entrepreneur the spin-off profits from her innovative actions.”). For other, more limited,
challenges, see Judith G. Greenberg, Insider Trading and Family Values, 4 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 303, 326–29 (1998) (arguing that traditional gender roles shape the way courts
think about insider trading regulation and that “Manne’s entrepreneur is the classic profitmaximizing male”); Jonathan R. Macey, Securities Trading: A Contractual Perspective, 50
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 269, 279–81 (1999) (arguing that the propriety of insider trading under
Manne’s proposal “becomes ‘simply’ an applied executive compensation problem”).
6. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading,
35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 869 (1983) (arguing that reducing insider trading regulations may make
sense because “both managers and shareholders have incentives to reach agreements ex ante
that limit divergent behavior by managers[.]” (citing Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3
J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976)).
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levels.7 Others have argued that legalizing insider trading could lead to
internal inefficiencies in a firm8 or that the people who actually trade on
inside information have little or no role in entrepreneurial action.9 Still
7. See Morris Mendelson, The Economics of Insider Trading Reconsidered, 117 U. PA. L.
REV. 470, 489 (1969) (reviewing MANNE, supra note 1) (“It is wholly unrealistic to assume
that if insider trading were completely prohibited, the corporate world would find no way to
compensate the entrepreneur. If the entrepreneur’s contribution to the corporation is truly
valuable and the corporation is shortsighted enough to fail to recognize and reward the
innovation, there will be a competitor interested in attracting the entrepreneur.”); Joel
Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic Information, 73
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1094 (1985) (calling Manne’s argument a “non sequitur” because “[t]he wage
market . . . is fully capable of responding to unique or valuable contributions.” (citing
Mendelson, supra, at 489)). Seligman explains that “[i]f the corporation for which an
entrepreneur works is unwilling to pay him his worth in the wage market, he may sell his
services to a competitive firm and receive greater compensation”. Seligman, supra, at 1094
(citing Mendelson, supra, at 489).
8. See, e.g., Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency
of the Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1053–67 (1982); see also Laura Nyantung
Beny, Insider Trading Laws and Stock Markets Around the World: An Empirical Contribution
to the Theoretical Law and Economics Debate, 32 J. CORP. L. 237, 244 n.33 (2007) (“If an
innovator held her information completely private, neither she nor her firm would benefit
because the innovation would never be developed. If she were to buy stock in the company
before disclosing her idea, her investment would have to account for the likelihood that she
could not sell her innovation within the firm, and she might be poorly situated to estimate this
risk. Realistically, the type of insider trading that regulators have been concerned with often
does not involve innovation at all but knowledge that a person secures because of her position
in the firm, such as knowledge about what the next quarterly report will say. To the extent
that innovation is involved, trading on the inside knowledge is likely to be sufficiently
downstream from the original innovative or entrepreneurial spark so that many who did not
contribute to its development will be able to benefit from it if they are allowed to trade on
their inside knowledge.”).
9. See Boyle, supra note 5, at 1507 (stating that “individuals making insider profits are
frequently far removed from a time or place or job in which they could perform any
entrepreneurial service for the company” (quoting MANNE, supra note 1, at 156–57)); James
D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the “Chicago School”, 1986
DUKE L.J. 628, 653 (“[M]ost insider-trading cases have not involved those whose
entrepreneurial or other managerial efforts have produced the value-increasing event that was
traded upon. Instead, the defendants have been outside directors, professionals, or clerks
whose assistance was used to complete the transaction, not to create it”); Merritt B. Fox,
Insider Trading in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate What?, 55 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. no. 4, 1992, at 263, 289 (noting that “even if the direction of the incentives created by
insider trading is positive, the persons actually responsible for creating the positive events are
likely to receive only a small portion of the total trading profits made on the news”);
Mendelson, supra note 7, at 490 (“The plain fact of the matter is that not everybody who may
gain from insider trading has participated in the innovation. And there is no real chance that
the respective rewards to the various persons engaging in insider trading will be
commensurate with their contributions to the innovation.”); Seligman, supra note 7, at 1094
n.55, 1095–96 (positing that “either insider trading would have to be legitimated for a large
number of persons who do not perform an entrepreneurial function—for example,
messengers, secretaries, bookkeepers, executives not performing entrepreneurial functions,
and outside directors—or the corporation itself would have to take on substantial
investigatory and enforcement costs to limit insider trading to appropriate entrepreneurs”
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others have argued that insider trading is akin to receiving a lottery
ticket,10 that it rewards the production of both good and bad
information,11 or that it is dependent on the insider’s access to capital.12
But these criticisms miss a fundamental objection to Manne’s proposal—
namely, that an entrepreneur cannot reliably gain from trading on the
innovations that Manne describes.13
Manne constructs the connection between insider trading and
entrepreneurial action on the foundation of Frank Knight’s classic text,
Risk, Uncertainty and Profit.14 Knight’s goal in writing this book was to
examine the role of the entrepreneur in the economic system and to
explain the concept of “profit,” which Knight regards as compensation
for entrepreneurial action.15 Under Knight’s approach, profit is distinct
from market returns on investments of property, labor, and capital.16
Stated more affirmatively, profit is the amount left over (the residual
income) for the entrepreneur after all of the providers of property,
labor, and capital have been paid.17 This narrow understanding of profit
(citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the
Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 332).
10. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and
the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 332 (“[I]nsider trading is an inefficient
compensation scheme. It amounts to paying managers in lottery tickets. The ticket costs the
shareholders the actuarial value of the payoff, but risk-average managers value the ticket at
less than that. The managers receive less than the firm gives up. Both shareholders and
managers could gain by abolition of insider trading.” (citing Kenneth E. Scott, Insider
Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 808 (1980));
Kenneth E. Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 801, 808 (1980).
11. See Boyle, supra note 5, at 1506 (“Manne has based his argument on originality and
uniqueness, but something can be uniquely bad as well as uniquely good.”); Fox, supra note 9,
at 288 (arguing that “since insiders can profit from trading on negative as well as positive
information, the availability of insider trading creates as much incentive to run the company
into the ground as to take it to the sky”); Seligman, supra note 7, at 1095 (“Corporate insiders
would be able to profit just as much from adverse corporate events as from good news.”).
12. Robert A. Prentice & Dain C. Donelson, Insider Trading as a Signaling Device, 47
AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 5 (2010) (stating that “compensation will be determined by [the inside
trader’s] existing wealth and ability to line up the financing necessary to trade” (citing
Mendelson, supra note 7, at 490)); Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne,
Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1455 n.84 (1967) (“Why should
the innovating entrepreneur, who happens to have inherited wealth, profit much more from
his “entrepreneurial” acts than his equally creative colleague who inherited nothing?”).
13. MANNE, supra note 1, at 135–36.
14. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921); MANNE, supra note 1,
at 112.
15. KNIGHT, supra note 14, at ix–xi.
16. Id. at 18 n.2 (referring to this concept as “pure profit”).
17. Id. at 18–19. See also Frank H. Knight, Profit and Entrepreneurial Functions, 2 J.
ECON. HIST., no. 51, Dec. 1942, at 126, 127 (1942) (stating that “profit” must be defined to
exclude wages or interest at the “going rate” for the entrepreneur’s own labor or capital).
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suggests entrepreneurial services are different from other factors of
production18 and implies a special role for the entrepreneur. Knight
argues that the entrepreneurial role fundamentally depends on the
distinction between “risk” and “uncertainty.”19
In common parlance, risk arises from any uncertainty about the
future, but Knight distinguishes situations in which the distribution of
potential outcomes is quantifiable (“risk”) from situations in which the
distribution of potential outcomes is unquantifiable “because the
situation dealt with is in a high degree unique” (“uncertainty”).20 Stated
more directly, “risk” is predictable and “uncertainty” is not.21 Where
outcomes can be predicted, competition eliminates profit.22 Of course,
market participants must still be compensated for bearing risk, so the
providers of property, labor, and capital will earn a market rate for the
assumption of risk, even in a perfectly competitive market. But profits
are generated only under conditions of uncertainty.23
If the role of the entrepreneur is to navigate in situations of
uncertainty, and uncertainty presumes lack of predictability, is the
entrepreneur’s compensation (profit) merely the result of luck? Stated
another way, are the returns from venturing into uncertainty purely
random? More to the point of this Essay, would an entrepreneur
actually benefit from trading on inside information if the outcomes on
which he is speculating are unpredictable?
Manne understood that “profit” in a Knightian sense arises from an
increase in value from an unpredictable event.24 Manne also understood
that the source of uncertainty was the lack of reliable information.25 But

18. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT at lix (Beard Books 2002)
(1921) (arguing that “entrepreneurship [is not] to be treated as a ‘factor of production’ on a
par with others, since it is not in at all the same sense measurable or subject to varying
proportions and marginal imputation”).
19. KNIGHT, supra note 14, at 19 (observing that the “confusion of ideas [regarding
profit] goes deep down into the foundations of our thinking” and, as indicated by the title of
the book, the “key to the whole tangle will be found to lie in the notion of risk or uncertainty
and the ambiguities concealed therein”).
20. Id. at 233.
21. Cf. MANNE, supra note 1, at 113 (“Risk in this context refers to changes in value that
may in some sense be said to be predictable . . . . The concept of uncertainty relates to the
areas of men’s ignorance, even in an approximate probability sense, of what the future
holds.”).
22. KNIGHT, supra note 14, at 18.
23. See id. at 310–11 (“Profit arises out of the inherent, absolute unpredictability of
things, out of the sheer brute fact that the results of human activity cannot be anticipated and
then only in so far as even a probability calculation in regard to them is impossible and
meaningless.”).
24. MANNE, supra note 1, at 114.
25. Id.
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Manne suggested that a “functional definition of uncertainty” would
allow for the existence of “a bit of information about the course of
events[,]” as long as that information was available “only at a cost most
men are unwilling to pay[.]”26
This analytical move is at the core of Manne’s argument, as it allows
him to describe a world in which some people (insiders) are merely
assuming risk while other people (outsiders) are acting under
uncertainty.27 Thus, rather than describing the corporate entrepreneur as
a person who ventures into uncertainty, Manne suggests that “the
entrepreneur does not perform tasks that are in their detail
predictable.”28 Manne seems caught by the ability of the entrepreneur to
predict the outcome of his action while outsiders are taken wholly by
surprise.
Knight had offered an alternative solution to the problem of
random returns in the world of uncertainty. While Manne caricatured
Knightian uncertainty as “an absolute lack of knowledge about the
future[,]”29 Knight was not describing a circumstance in which outcomes
were random. Although the entrepreneur exists because market
participants lack perfect foreknowledge,30 Knight claimed that the role
of the entrepreneur is to “improve knowledge, especially foresight, and
bear the incidence of its limitations.”31 Knight calls this attribute of
entrepreneurs a form of “judgment.”32
Some judgments are susceptible to measurement, such as the results
of a coin flip, which Knight calls “ ‘a priori’ probability,”33 while other
judgments produce results that are similar to past events for which we
have made repeated empirical observations, which Knight calls
“[s]tatistical probability.”34 When a judgment about the future is based
on measurement in one of these ways, the predicted event is said to be
subject to risk.35

26. Id.
27. Id. at 115.
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 114.
30. KNIGHT, supra note 18, at lix (“Universal foreknowledge would leave no place for an
‘entrepreneur.’ ”).
31. Id.
32. KNIGHT, supra note 14, at 311.
33. Id. at 224 (describing situations involving a priori probability as those in which
“ ‘chances’ can be computed on general principles”).
34. Id. at 225.
35. See NICOLAI J. FOSS & PETER G. KLEIN, ORGANIZING ENTREPRENEURIAL
JUDGMENT: A NEW APPROACH TO THE FIRM 84 (2012).
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The more interesting judgments, for our purposes, are those that
Knight labels as “estimates.”36 These judgments cannot be measured
because the circumstances in which they are made are unique.37 This is
the usual domain of entrepreneurship, which “involves the discovery,
evaluation and exploitation of opportunities to introduce new goods and
services, ways of organizing, markets, processes, and raw materials
through organizing efforts that previously had not existed.”38 When a
judgment about the future is not based on measurement, the predicted
event is subject to uncertainty.39
Armed with this more nuanced understanding of risk and
uncertainty, the shortcoming of Manne’s proposal is quite clear: the
entrepreneur in Manne’s proposal has thought of and operationalized an
innovation, but has not yet disclosed the innovation to the world.40
Manne would have this entrepreneur trade on the information about her
own accomplishment, as if the entrepreneur had left the realm of
uncertainty and entered the domain of risk (while the rest of the world
continued to labor under uncertainty).41 The problem here is that the
entrepreneur must purchase shares before the market validates the idea.
Prior to disclosure, the innovation remains merely the entrepreneur’s
estimate about the future, and there is no reason to think that the
entrepreneur would gain from trading in a world of uncertainty.
This insight suggests a still deeper concern with Manne’s proposal,
namely, that the would-be corporate entrepreneur who is allowed to
gain through insider trading would have an incentive to avoid venturing
into the land of uncertainty, where judgments about the future are
unmeasurable. Instead, the entrepreneur would be incentivized to
engage in measurable risk taking. Manne criticized profit-sharing plans,
like bonuses and stock options, on the ground that they “induce the
smaller kinds of innovations and cost-saving techniques rather than
radical, major, dramatic developments.”42 The legalization of insider

36. KNIGHT, supra note 14, at 225.
37. Id. (stating that “there is no valid basis of any kind for classifying instances”).
38. SCOTT SHANE, A GENERAL THEORY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE INDIVIDUALOPPORTUNITY NEXUS 4 (2003) (citing S. Venkataraman, The Distinctive Domain of
Entrepreneurship Research: An Editor’s Perspective, in 3 ADVANCES IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP,
FIRM EMERGENCE, AND GROWTH 119, 130–31 (Jerome A. Katz ed., 1997); Scott Shane & S.
Venkataraman, The Promise of Entrepreneurship as a Field of Research, 25 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 217, 220 (2000)).
39. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.
40. MANNE, supra note 1, at 133.
41. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.
42. MANNE, supra note 1, at 136.
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trading would provide a strong incentive to produce such incremental
advancements.
Manne’s conception of the corporate entrepreneur who is
compensated through insider trading rests on an implausible account of
the viability of trading on entrepreneurial action, but what of the
incentive problem he identifies? Is Manne correct to assert that “[a]n
individual cannot be hired to perform x amount of entrepreneurial
service”?43 Some of Knight’s passages seem to support this notion,44 but
Ronald Coase famously countered Knight by claiming that people could
simply sell their superior judgment.45 After all, “[e]very business buys
the services of a host of advisers.”46
Others agree with Knight that markets for entrepreneurial
judgment are closed and suggest that one implication of this fact is that
“the entrepreneur has to start a firm to capture the returns to his
judgment.”47 To be sure, the facilitation of startups through innovative
financing ecosystems seems to have largely resolved the incentive
problem Manne identified.48 Contrary to Manne’s observations in 1966,49
the Silicon Valley model of startup financing does not require
entrepreneurs to be wealthy to found their own businesses,50 and the
staged financing of startups by outside investors provides ample
incentive for entrepreneurs to plunge into uncertainty.51

43. Id. at 133.
44. KNIGHT, supra note 14, at 251 (describing decisions made in the face of uncertainty as
depending on factors that “are so largely on the inside of the person making the decisions”
that they are not subject to measurement).
45. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 400–01 (1937). But see
Nicolai J. Foss, The “Alternative” Theories of Knight and Coase, and the Modern Theory of the
Firm, 18 J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 76, 88 (1996) (arguing that entrepreneurial judgment
cannot be traded on a market).
46. Coase, supra note 45, at 400.
47. See, e.g., FOSS & KLEIN, supra note 35, at 166. But see RICHARD N. LANGLOIS, THE
DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM: SCHUMPETER, CHANDLER, AND THE NEW
ECONOMY 86 (2007) (“[C]hanges in technology and markets opened up attractive rentseeking possibilities that could be seized only by breaking down or ‘unbundling’ the vertical
structure of the managerial corporation.”).
48. MANNE, supra note 1, at 133.
49. Id. at 119–20.
50. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1070–76 (2003) (detailing how the venture
capital market provides financing for startups).
51. See D. Gordon Smith, Team Production in Venture Capital Investing, 24 J. CORP. L.
949, 965–70 (1999) (describing the benefits of staged financing to the venture capitalist and
the entrepreneur).
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Research on entrepreneurship within established organizations—
now often referred to as “corporate entrepreneurship”52 or
“intrapreneur[ship]”53—also suggests that the proliferation of profitsharing compensation (primarily stock option plans) over the past
several decades encourages entrepreneurial action, contrary to Manne’s
speculation. The study of corporate entrepreneurship tends to focus on
ways to dislodge organizational inertia.54 Established firms may engage
in intrapreneurship by launching new business ventures related to their
existing products or markets; creating new products, services, or
technologies; reformulating their existing strategies or reorganizing the
firm; and “pursuing enhanced competitiveness [through] initiative and
risk taking . . . competitive aggressiveness and boldness.”55 Corporate
entrepreneurship is increasingly viewed as a strategic imperative.56
Manne focuses on the individual corporate entrepreneur, but
researchers sometimes consider companies to be intrapreneurial as a
whole, with each individual within the firm being capable of
entrepreneurial behavior.57 From this perspective, corporate
entrepreneurship is conducted by groups or teams. In some cases, these
teams are tasked with a specific assignment, but other times, the teams
are created in a less formal, ad hoc manner. In either case, the teams
might evolve and change during the life of the entrepreneurial endeavor.
Although Manne’s proposal assumes that financial incentives are a
principal driver of corporate entrepreneurship, the organizational
structure and values of a company can have a significant impact on
levels of corporate entrepreneurship:

52. See, e.g., MICHAEL H. MORRIS, DONALD F. KURATKO & JEFFREY G. COVIN,
CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP & INNOVATION 11–12 (3d ed. 2011).
53. See, e.g., GIFFORD PINCHOT III, INTRAPRENEURING: WHY YOU DON’T HAVE TO
LEAVE THE CORPORATION TO BECOME AN ENTREPRENEUR, at xi–xiii (1985).
54. D. Gordon Smith & Masako Ueda, Law & Entrepreneurship: Do Courts Matter?, 1
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 353, 356 (2006).
55. Bostjan Antoncic & Robert D. Hisrich, Intrapreneurship: Construct Refinement and
Cross-Cultural Validation, 16 J. BUS. VENTURING 495, 499 (2001).
56. See, e.g., Shelley Morrisette & William Oberman, Shifting Strategic Imperatives: A
Stages of Leadership Perspective on the Adoption of Corporate Entrepreneurship, 18 J.
APPLIED MGMT. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP, no. 2, 2013, at 59, 64 (“Companies cannot remain
static, but must continuously adjust, adapt or redefine themselves.” (citing MICHAEL H.
MORRIS, DONALD F. KURATKO & JEFFREY G. COVIN, CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP &
INNOVATION 4–7 (2d ed. 2008)).
57. MANNE, supra note 1, 115–16; Olga Belousova & Benoît Gailly, Corporate
Entrepreneurship in a Dispersed Setting: Actors, Behaviors, and Process, 9 INT’L
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & MGMT. J. 361, 362 (2013) (describing “dispersed corporate”
entrepreneurship, which “assumes that entrepreneurial initiatives are developed as embedded
in the corporate context by the employees who combine the entrepreneurial activity with their
‘job as usual[]’ ”).
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Firms that nurture organizational structures and values conducive
to intrapreneurial activities and have intrapreneurial orientations
are more likely to grow than organizations that are low in such
characteristics. Open and quality communication, existence of
formal controls, intensive environmental scanning, management
support, organizational support, and values help an organization
become more intrapreneurial.58
In some companies, entrepreneurship is conducted within separate
organizations created at a distance from the main company.59 This
practice is sometimes motivated by a belief that “entrepreneurship and
management are fundamentally different processes and that they need
to be separated structurally.”60 Managers of large corporations have
become increasingly interested in startup success and have attempted to
incorporate practices and structures conducive to startup success within
established firms, including corporate venture capital61 and corporate
incubation.62 It is not clear that Manne’s proposal would encourage
either of these practices.
The main thrust of Manne’s proposal relates to compensation for
entrepreneurial services. According to Manne, a compensation
mechanism that would encourage entrepreneurial action “should not
require a large, long-term financial investment by the entrepreneur”63
and cannot be determined in advance because “[t]rue innovation cannot
be predicted nor its value known before it has been thought of and made

58. Antoncic & Hisrich, supra note 55, at 523.
59. L.D. DeSimone, George N. Hatsopoulos, William F. O’Brien, Bill Harris, Charles P.
Holt, How Can Big Companies Keep the Entrepreneurial Spirit Alive?, HARVARD BUS. REV.
(Nov.-Dec. 1995), https://hbr.org/1995/11/how-can-big-companies-keep-the-entrepreneurialspirit-alive [https://perma.cc/5PZ2-P8ZD].
60. Belousova & Gailly, supra note 57, at 363.
61. Tobias Weiblen & Henry W. Chesbrough, Engaging with Startups to Enhance
Corporate Innovation, 57 CAL. MGMT. REV., no. 2, Winter 2015, at 66, 70 (“An obvious
means for a company to engage in entrepreneurial activity is to finance it. Equity stakes in
promising external startups allow a corporation to keep an eye on interesting technologies
and markets, influence the decisions of their portfolio companies, and potentially profit
financially.”).
62. Id. at 71 (“Not all smart ideas and promising technologies are found out in the wild—
in some cases, they are born in the corporate environment, but do not fit with the current core
business or business model. To profit from such cases of ‘misfit’ internal innovation, corporate
incubators have emerged as a means to bring them to market as new companies.”).
63. MANNE, supra note 1, at 133 (noting that without some guarantee that anyone may
sell entrepreneurial services, “we should anticipate that entrepreneurial profits would be
gained only by those wealthy enough to found their own businesses and exploit their own
innovations”). Clearly, Manne was writing before the advent of Silicon Valley-style venture
capital investing.

95 N.C. L. REV. 1481 (2017)

2017]

INSIDER TRADING

1517

effective.”64 Based on these two attributes of the compensation system,
Manne eliminates salary,65 bonuses,66 and stock options67 as meaningful
incentive mechanisms. Manne offers only a tepid endorsement of profitsharing plans,68 but more recent research on corporate entrepreneurship
shows that “employees’ willingness to participate in a new corporate
venture increases with increased profit sharing[.]”69
Like many entrepreneurship scholars, Manne distinguishes
“managers” and “entrepreneurs,”70 but in most firms, the CEO is
ultimately responsible for creating an emphasis on corporate
entrepreneurship.71 Consistent with Manne’s thesis, a CEO’s willingness
to engage in or encourage entrepreneurial behavior is determined by
compensation structure.72 Short-term compensation, which “typically
includes salary, annual bonuses, and other short-term incentives[,]”
discourages pursuit of a risky strategy.73 Conversely, “[l]ong-term
compensation, which links the rewards of executives to long-term
organizational performance, usually includes stock options, restricted
stock grants, and other long-term incentives[,]” and so encourages
riskier behavior in return for a better payout.74 Thus, Manne’s
reservations about profit-sharing plans do not seem justified.
Manne purports to ground his analysis of insider trading on Frank
Knight’s distinction between risk and uncertainty, but as stated above,
Manne amends Knight’s understanding of uncertainty by assuming that
the entrepreneur has information about the future that is not possessed
by the market as a whole. Modern entrepreneurs behave more like the
64. Id. at 133 (noting that an implication of this indeterminacy is that “[a]n individual
cannot be hired to perform x amount of entrepreneurial service”).
65. Id. at 134 (“Salary is appropriate only to purchase a known service in the labor
market.”).
66. Id. (arguing that a profit-sharing plan “in which the recipients and their percentage of
profits are determined in advance” makes the employee an investor and risk-taker, but not an
entrepreneur).
67. Id. at 136–37 (lamenting that stock options must be granted prior to the innovation).
68. Id. at 135–36 (conceding that a profit-sharing bonus “tends to give some incentive for
entrepreneurial activity[,]” but suggesting that any profit-sharing plans’ “tendency will be to
induce the smaller kinds of innovations and cost-saving techniques rather than radical, major,
dramatic developments”).
69. Erik Monsen, Holger Patzelt & Todd Saxton, Beyond Simple Utility: Incentive Design
and Trade-Offs for Corporate Employee-Entrepreneurs, 34 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY &
PRAC. 105, 118 (2010).
70. MANNE, supra note 1, at 115–17.
71. Yu-Kai (Mike) Wang, Chris Changwha Chung & Dominic S.K. Lim, The Drivers of
International Corporate Entrepreneurship: CEO Incentive and CEO Monitoring Mechanisms,
50 J. WORLD BUS. 742, 744 (2015).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 745.
74. Id.
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entrepreneurs imagined by Knight, investing in their own judgment by
accepting stock compensation when they make a decision to found or
join a firm,75 thus effectively solving the incentive problem Henry
Manne identified without needing to legalize insider trading.

75. See KNIGHT, supra note 14, at 311; Richard Harroch, How Employee Stock Options
Work in Startup Companies, FORBES (Feb. 27, 2016,10:32 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/allbusiness/2016/02/27/how-employee-stock-options-work-in-startup-companies/#3ec73c526633
[https://perma.cc/LH2G-7NMY].

